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Judicial Review of Agency
Deregulation: Alternatives and
Problems for the Courts
James T. O'Reilly*
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal appellate judges, like veteran law professors, correct
the errors of administrative agencies during the judicial review of
rulemaking actions. Like a stern but forgiving professor correcting
the flawed work of a student, the court often expresses its view of
the reason for the error and its view of the proper way in which the
agency should have carried out its administrative functions. The
recent increase in agency deregulatory activity, however, threatens
to upset this educational relationship. As agencies have moved to
rescind or suspend existing rules, proponents of the affected rules
have asked the courts to preserve the rules under theories ranging
from those of stare decisis to those of entitlement to the continued
existence of a rule. Under the pressure of these challenges the
courts subtly have abandoned their concepts of deference to ad-
ministrative rulemaking decisions. Deregulation has shifted the
courts' sympathies from the agencies to the beneficiaries of endan-
gered rules.
This Article takes a preliminary look at how deregulation has
fared in the courts and at the significance of the evolving federal
appellate and United States Supreme Court case law for future
agency rulemaking decisions. Part II of this Article examines the
various categories of regulation and the aspects of each category
that may be subject to deregulation. Part III defines deregulation
and explores some of the reasons why an agency may wish to de-
regulate. Part IV examines the utility of judicial oversight of de-
regulation, and part V then discusses the mechanics of deregula-
tion, focusing on the various means by which an agency may
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nullify a rule and the procedures needed for each method. Finally,
part VI explores the effects of the United States Supreme Court's
recent decision in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.1 on future agency
deregulation efforts.
II. THE CONCEPTUAL CATEGORIES OF REGULATIONS
Federal administrative procedure serves as a uniform mecha-
nism for the adoption of a wide variety of rules. The text of any
federal regulation must include standard features identifying the
rule's scope, authority, and commands,2 but the purposes underly-
ing any of the thousands of different rules will vary greatly. A
rule's purpose and background will rarely be self-evident. One
must examine the purposes behind each category of regulation
before debating the merits of deregulatory efforts in that category.
A first category of regulations reflects the economic interest of
the government and the regulated parties in preserving a certain
economic allocation scheme." An agency intending to permit pro-
ducers of lemons to allocate markets, for example, adopts a system
of regulations through Agricultural Marketing Orders that preserve
defined price levels at the expense of consumers.4 The economic
rulemaking systems commonly have special statutory arrange-
ments that legislative supporters have structured to serve eco-
nomic goals.5 Deregulation in this area is a subtle form of economic
warfare. Regulations promulgated in this type of regulatory system
are vulnerable to efforts to reduce consumer costs. Competing eco-
nomic groups of producers and consumers advocating deregulation
may shake the consensus of political support that led to creation of
1. 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983).
2. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982). The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§
551-706 (1982), contains the bulk of federal administrative procedure.
3. For example, the Interstate Commerce Commission controls railroad and truck
rates for carriage of goods as a means of managing the conflicting desires of producers, ship-
pers, carriers, and consumers. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101, 10701-10734 (Supp. V 1981); see also
Note, Teamsters, Truckers, and the ICC: A Political and Economic Analysis of Motor Car-
rier Deregulation, 17 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 123, 130-33 (1980).
4. 7 C.F.R. § 910.50-.52 (1983).
5. For example, special and detailed legislation supports the federally subsidized ves-
sels that carry on United States ocean shipping. 46-U.S.C. §§ 1151-1161 (1979 & Supp. V
1981). Other specialty legislation fits the particular needs of regulated submarkets; an exam-
ple of such legislation is a recent act of Congress that allowed 20,000 turkeys to be slaugh-
tered and marketed without federal meat inspection. Act of June 30, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
206, 96 Stat. 136.
510 [Vol. 37:509
JUDICIAL REVIEW
the regulatory system.e The demise of trucking regulation, through
a combination of statutory and regulatory action, is a much-stud-
ied illustration of this type of economic deregulation.7
Another regulatory system encompasses the "safety" consider-
ations that have prompted the government to protect bread pur-
chasers, car owners, cosmetic users, residents of communities with
nuclear plants, and other consumers from acute risks of harm
through the misfeasance or malfeasance of producers. In this cate-
gory of safety considerations Congress often has delegated power
to a regulator with fewer statutory restraints.8 Therefore, a com-
mon element of regulations for injury prevention is broad discre-
tionary power in the regulator, exercised in reaction to perceived
risk categories, according to priorities set by accident or illness sta-
tistics.' The agency seeks control of the safety risks under powers
that were stated broadly in the agency's enabling legislation. An
automobile safety standard for collision features10 or a drug safety
rule imposing a warning about a color believed to cause allergic
reactions"' is a responsive regulatory command to an immediately
perceived risk. Deregulation in this area gives rise to disputes over
the statistical incidence of the accidents or illnesses that prompted
the rule and to disagreements concerning the relative public bene-
fits and costs of any particular risk-avoidance rule.
12
Government authorities design a third type of rule to further
environmental goals such as wetlands preservation, air quality, and
wilderness protection." The bases of many regulations against
6. See generally S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982). First Circuit Judge
Stephen Breyer, a former aide to Senator Edward Kennedy, has written one of the best
modem studies of economic deregulation from the legal perspective.
7. See id.; R. LrrAN & W. NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION 40-41 (1983).
8. Safety statutes routinely feature delegations that are more broad and open ended
than the delegations in the economic regulation setting. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 343 (1982)
(food labeling for safety) with 7 U.S.C. § 2014 (Supp. V 1981) (distribution of food stamps).
9. See, e.g., Aqua Slide 'n Dive, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d 831,
840 (5th Cir. 1978) (requiring the Commission to demonstrate unreasonable risk through
accident statistics).
10. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1982).
11. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 201.20 (1983).
12. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (parties
disputing appropriate cost/benefit analysis); Sullivan, The Benzene Decision: A Contribu-
tion to Regulatory Confusion, 33 AD. L. REv. 360 (1981); Sullivan, The Cotton Dust Deci-
sion: The Confusion Continues, 34 AD. L. REv. 483 (1982).
13. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has adopted some of the most com-
plex environmental rules. The Clean Air Act requires that the EPA set air quality standards
and that the states develop plans to implement the standards. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-18571
(1976). The Act's prohibition of consideration of economic infeasibility added even more
1984]
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chronic damage to the environment are susceptible to scientific de-
bate. 14 For example, the cost and possibility of achieving benefits
such as saving fish and wildlife from "acid rain" are open to de-
bate.15 In this category of regulations, managers of the deregulating
agency are likely to experience opposition to both the environmen-
tal costs and the economic benefits of deregulation."
An additional class of regulation is the set of limitations on
income transfers or welfare benefits, such as food stamp eligibility
rules, that Congress attaches to a beneficiary program.17 The
agency seeking to deregulate this area confronts an established
benefit with an established constituency hostile to any possible re-
duction in benefits. If Congress disagrees with an administrative
agency's deregulation through revision of recipient eligibility, it
has several means to resist the changes. 8 Congress' ability to pre-
vent change in this category makes this type of deregulation pecu-
liarly subject to a recipient-based political backlash.
No bright line divides the several classes of regulations. The
need for reform of an economic regulation might be motivated by
the same reasons given for cutting back the eligibility requirements
of benefit receipts. The motivating factor may be the budget defi-
complexity to these rules. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257 (1976).
14. For example, chlorofluorocarbons may or may not affect the ozone layer of the
earth enough to cause skin cancer. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), however,
accepted the scientific arguments for this causation and banned the use of chlorofluoro-
carbons. 21 C.F.R. § 300.100 (1983).
15. Some meteorological studies suggest that sulfur and nitrous oxides from coal fired
power plants affect the acidity of precipitation several hundred miles downwind of the
source. The Reagan Administration's early approach to the acid rain controversy, however,
focused more on the costs of regulation to the affected industry. In an address to the Ken-
tucky Coal conference, an aide to former EPA Administrator Gorsuch said that the Reagan
Administration's decision process on environmental questions would include "common sense
and a healthy regard for economic realities." Senate Acid Rain Amendment Labeled 'Ex-
cessive,' 'Premature' by EPA Official, 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 16, at 530 (Aug. 20, 1982).
16. The political opposition to environmental regulations is a natural reflection of the
differing constituencies of science, economics, and consumer/user attention. These conflict-
ing concerns are represented in both the legislative debates about Clean Air Act provisions
and the EPA rulemaking process itself. Uncertainties exist and the EPA has been accorded
some deference in resolving them. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 12 n.16 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
17. 'See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a), (b) (1982) (delegating the power to set food stamp
eligibility rules); 7 C.F.R. §§ 273.1-.12 (1983) (implementing the eligibility rules); see also
Allen v. Bergland, 661 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1981) (distributee's challenge to food stamp eligi-
bility rules).
18. Congress need only continue the funding of the program and refuse to permit the
use of funds to terminate the benefits of preiously eligible recipients. Prohibiting the ad-
ministrative agency from cutting off beneficiaries is a persuasive tactic in maintaining
eligibility.
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cits of the administration, but the basis of change will be different.
Environmental rule changes and health protection rescissions are
also similar. Both types of changes can arise from conscientious
reexamination of the extent of government participation in a par-
ticular field and the extent to which the rules are likely to produce
the desired result.19 For purposes of this Article, the attention
given to deregulation measures is the same for each class of rules.
Devices for rescinding or modifying rules are constant among the
varying statutory missions that the different rules serve.
III. DEREGULATION
If the concept of regulation allows no uniform expression of
means and ends, so deregulation as a general concept is not suscep-
tible of a single expression. In general, deregulation is the con-
scious withdrawal of an earlier command, control, eligibility, or ex-
clusion regulation, regardless of the means chosen for the
deregulation.20
The range of problems that a rule's elimination or modifica-
tion might seek to correct, however, is too broad to fit within a
general definition. 21 A rule may be functionally obsolete because of
engineering advances.22 A rule may reflect an erroneous estimate of
19. Two Reagan Administration deregulatory efforts relying on these justifications
were the proposals to revoke certain Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) safety standards, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.4 (1983), and to reduce strip mine regulatory
controls, 30 C.F.R. §§ 840-845 (1982). The Administration argued that the revocation did
not lessen workers' safety or the mine environment's protection. For an advocacy paper
critical of the Administration's deregulation policy, see C. LUDLAM, UNDERMINING PUBLIC
PROTECTIONS: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION REGULATORY PROGRAM (Alliance for Justice Re-
port, 1981).
20. Deregulation is more than the converse of "rulemaking." Although the definition
of rulemaking covers the amending or repealing of a rule, 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (1982), deregula-
tion also can include nonaction or the choice to adopt adjudicatory rather than rulemaking
approaches to a problem. See infra text accompanying notes 64-163. Deregulation has been
defined simply as "cutting back Federal controls," S. REP. No. 1018, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,
2 (1980).
21. Aligned against the four types of rules in the preceding section, deregulation com-
monly consists of such actions as elimination of a radio station regulatory requirement by
the Federal Communications Commission, modification of a design safety requirement by
the Federal Aviation Administration, adoption of a new measuring system such as the com-
bined air emissions "bubble" system of the Environmental Protection Agency, and revision
of standards for computing "income" for food stamp recipients.
22. The government initially set railroad safety rules on changing wheels of railroad
cars when cars used iron wheels, and altered the rules to lessen the number of replacements
required when railroad companies began using more durable steel wheels. Neustadt, The
Administration's Regulatory Reform Program: An Overview, 32 AD. L. Rv. 129, 150 (1980).
Likewise, an agency is likely to alter a recordkeeping rule that does not take into account
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costs or an underestimate of the number of affected citizens.23 A
rule may allow certain uses of a hazardous material, thus creating a
potentially grave danger.24 Modification or repeal of a rule in these
circumstances is more costly for an agency than allowing the
perpetutation of the status quo.25 The agency, however, usually
will feel troubled enough by retention of the existing rule to justify
taking the more costly deregulatory steps.
Events during the Reagan Administration suggest that some
deregulation has a political basis. The electorate chose President
Reagan partly because of a platform commitment to decreased fed-
eral regulation, and the President in turn selected teams of public
officials dedicated to a policy of deregulation. The Reagan Admin-
istration acted upon what it perceived to be an electoral mandate
supporting deregulation. 6
Deregulation has become such a popular topic in recent years
that some observers incorrectly believe that it was the creation of
the Reagan Administration. For decades agencies have allowed
rules to lapse or have withdrawn or not adopted rules. Rarely
before, however, have agency managers consciously focused on the
topic of deregulation. The Reagan Administration first manifested
that focus by "freezing," as of Inauguration Day, 1981, many of the
newly enacted and pending rules that the Carter Administration
computerized data collection. See 21 C.F.R. § 211.180(d) (1983) (FDA rule concerning
microfiche and computer retention of records).
23. Health officials revised black lung statutes to alter the program's eligibility rules
after the discovery that 400,000 people, instead of 4000, would have been eligible under the
old rules. 20 C.F.R. § 410 (1983).
24. Rules allowing the use of saccharin in foods may be rescinded if saccharin use is
later proven hazardous. 21 C.F.R. § 101.11 (1983). The most widely known carcinogen prohi-
bition in federal law, the Delaney clause, 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3) (1982), is an example of a
legislative command that later-developed information should be used to disqualify previ-
ously accepted material in a regulated use.
25. Although the agency has to bear some overhead costs in maintaining a rule, the
people seeking to change the rule will generate more costs as the agency managers progress
through the requisite levels of approval for the changes. Therefore, managers seldom allo-
cate enough of their limited resources to developing the record needed to make deregulation
a success. See infra text accompanying notes 246-50.
26. The Administration has claimed that the mandate to reduce regulation is a "re-
sponse to the growing opposition of the American people to the increasing intrusiveness of
government regulations," and that it made regulatory relief one of its first priorities. Office
of the Vice-President, Highlights of Regulatory Relief Accomplishments During the Reagan
Administration (Aug. 1983). Commentators fully anticipated such a policy position. Brown,
Regulatory Balance May Shift to Dismantlers, Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 1981, at L5, col. 1.
27. The Carter Administration's effort at deregulation is summarized in Neustadt,
supra note 22, at 129.
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published during its last days in office."8 This freeze was unique in
modern administrative law. Zealous Reagan Administration dereg-
ulation replaced zealous Carter Administration regulation-writing.
In February 1981 the Reagan government issued commands to
hold, retract, and withhold effectiveness from many of the Carter
"midnight regulations" published in multiple Federal Register is-
sues during mid-January 1981.9
Shortly after Reagan's inauguration, the second shock of de-
regulation hit the agencies as new officials took office declaring
their intentions to reduce their agencies' established budgets and
powers. Rivalries created by this policy change gave rise to the
many deregulation court challenges from 1982 to 1984.30 The third
shock came in February 1981 when the President issued a stronger
executive order on regulatory analysis.31 The 1981 order was a mild
trauma in comparison to the first two events. The first two changes
consisted of well-announced actions on prior rules and the installa-
tion of new authors for ensuing rules; the third change imposed a
conscious limitation on many future rulemaking policies.
To study deregulation as an historical anecdote of the politics
of 1981 would be folly. Government officials have practiced deregu-
lation by modification of rules to cure specific problems for years.
The Carter Administration undertook an extensive deregulation
project, but the Administration's approach was one of quiet reor-
ganization. 2 The Administration refrained from deregulation in
28. The Reagan Administration nicknamed the 150 final rules that the Carter Admin-
istration adopted during its last month in office the "midnight regulations." Fact Sheet:
Memo to Executive Branch Agencies Ordering 60-Day Freeze on Regulations (Jan. 29, 1981)
(White House press release).
29. The "Freeze Order" was published as Postponement of Pending Regulations, 46
Fed. Reg. 11,227 (1981).
30. Many of the significant court decisions during 1981 to 1984 discussing judicial re-
view of deregulation arose because of active deregulation in early 1981. See, e.g., 46 Fed.
Reg. 12,033 (1981) (reopening of the air bags rulemaking), discussed in Motor Vehicle Mfr.
Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856, 2864 (1983); 46 Fed. Reg. 44,198
(1981) (regulation of truck drivers), discussed in Professional Drivers Council v. Bureau of
Motor Carrier Safety, 706 F.2d 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
31. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981). The order imposed a specific limita-
tion on future rulemaking and required reexamination of existing rules. See id. § 3(i).
32. For a discussion of the Carter Administration's work, see Neustadt, supra note 22,
at 129-59. Carter's Reorganization Project considered structural mergers within the Execu-
tive Branch, while his Regulatory Advisory Review Group reviewed new rules and his Regu-
latory Council coordinated new initiatives for the agencies. Memorandum on Strengthening
Regulatory Management, PuB. PAPERs, Oct. 31, 1978, at 1905; see Tolchin, Presidential
Power and the Politics of RARG, REG., July-Aug. 1979, at 44.
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the health, environmental, and social categories of regulation,33
and instead concentrated on economic deregulation. 4 President
Carter carried out his economic deregulation with the full coopera-
tion of a democratic Congress. 5 Under the leadership of Senator
Edward Kennedy, Carter's deregulatory forces scored impressive
legislative and rulemaking changes against energy price controls,
trucking route allocation, and airline price and route controls.36 In
the few instances when courts reviewed these changes, the courts
found deregulation palatable as a type of economically justified ad-
justment to statutory programs. 37
IV. THE UTILITY OF JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT
Just as teachers often cannot solve problems that a student
manifests as a result of family difficulties-the student whose
problems reflect pain or pressure from parents may be beyond the
cure of the schools-the federal courts, while able to offer tempo-
rary shelter from the special problems caused by a deregulatory
action, rarely can offer relief that will readily and completely cure
the underlying problems occasioning the agency action. Therefore,
judicial review is not an ideal solution for the problems that an
offended advocacy group has with deregulation"' or that an agency
has in its relationships with the President or Congress.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) empowers the
courts to review administrative rulemaking s The "arbitrary or ca-
pricious" standard of review generally governs the courts' review of
agency rulemaking. 9 A court will enjoin an agency from adopting a
rule modification, or termination, or a court may declare the
amended rule invalid, if the court finds that the agency has acted
33. See supra text accompanying notes 2-19.
34. For example, the Carter Administration helped Congress deregulate trucking rates.
49 U.S.C. § 10701 (Supp. V 1981).
35. See DeMuth, The White House Review Programs, REG., Jan.-Feb. 1980, at 13;
Neustadt, supra note 22.
36. See S. BREYER, supra note 6; R. LrrA & W. NoRDHAus, supra note 7, at 40-41.
37. No one has compared the number of modified regulations voided on judicial review
preceding and subsequent to 1981. Impressions, however, suggest that the pre-1981 efforts
at more conservative deregulation met with more success on review than those efforts after
1981. Compare Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 636 F.2d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1980) with
Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 715 F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (less deferential to agency discretion).
38. Regulatory negotiation may be a superior way for these groups to resolve the
problems that deregulation has caused them. See Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure
for Malaise, 71 GEo. L.J. 1 (1982).
39. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1982).
40. Id. § 706(2)(A).
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in an arbitrary or capricious manner in affecting the rule.41 Re-
cently, courts have begun to address deregulation by pressing the
agency to cure its inactivity with more regulatory rulemaking.42
The courts' deferential acceptance of policy decisions made by
agencies is a widely accepted model of judicial review.' s Studies of
actual judicial review of policy-based rules, however, suggest that
the courts strictly scrutinize the rulemaking agency's policy deci-
sions.44 An agency manager reporting to the President and Con-
gress already has more than 536 elected critics of the agency's per-
formance to restrain the administrator's policy options.' 5 If the
more than 800 federal judges 46 choose not to defer to the agency on
what the agency believes are policy decisions, then much of the
policy power will shift from elected officials to the courts, at least
in deciding the limits of an agency's policy options. Judicial review
of deregulation has done much to crystallize this trend.47 At one
point judges could differentiate policy choices, factual decisions,
and interpretations of law, and could find different review ap-
proaches for each.48 Recently, however, the courts have applied a
more exacting scrutiny even to the most policy-based instances of
deregulation. Recognizing that the judiciary could be a potent op-
ponent of a new policy, the administrations of both parties ob-
41. Unless an agency's enabling statute provides for another type of review, the court
may grant injunctive or declaratory relief. Id. § 705; see L. JAFFE, JUDICLAL CONTROL OF
ArmiNisTRATmrE ACTION 193-94 (1965); J. O'RmILY, ADmmsTRATwv RULEMANG 264 (1983).
42. See Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 710 F.2d
842, 846-47 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Courts are empowered to "compel agency action unlawfully
withheld or unreasonably delayed." 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1982).
43. Judicial deference to agency decisions is a widely accepted concept when applied
to pure policy matters. McGowan, Managing the Regulatory Process, 32 AD. L. Rzv. 239,
245 (1980) (panel discussion).
44. When courts are reviewing administrative agency action, they more frequently dis-
cuss deference than actually give deference to the agency. This trend is discussed in
O'Reilly, Deference Makes a Difference: A Study of the Impacts of the Bumpers Judicial
Review Amendment, 49 U. CIN. L. Rav. 739, 745-46 (1980).
45. Of the 536 elected government officials-435 House members, 100 Senators, and
the President-five people wield the most influence: the chairman of the House and Senate
appropriations subcommittees for the agency, the chairman of the subject matter commit-
tees that perform oversight of the agency functions and control reauthorization of the
agency's statutory power, and the President.
46. The complement of federal judges, of course, is far greater than the number of
judges who actually hear administrative agency appeals in any given year. Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual Report of the Director at 3, table 2 (1981).
47. Courts have had much more opportunity to review agency action as opponents of
deregulation have attempted to use judicial review as a defensive tool against deregulation.
Wines, Administration, Critics Play Legal Cat and Mouse Game on Agency Rules, 14
NAT'L J. 2157 (1982).
48. McGowan, supra note 43, at 245.
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jected to changes in the system of judicial deference on matters of
policy.
49
As the mood of Congress or the President shifts against a par-
ticular regulatory system, the agency may feel significant pressures
to lessen or eliminate a set of rules.50 The courts, however, are ca-
pable of nullifying the policy change by means of fact-specific en-
forcement commands, injunctions, and consent orders,51 if the
court finds that deregulatory action was arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or contrary to law.52
Deregulation poses a new quandary for the socially concerned,
activist judge. Congress can retract a regulatory grant or force ap-
propriations upon an agency that would prefer to starve an errant
program. With few exceptions, a President can forestall deregu-
latory actions.5 3 When a court enters the fray of overseeing agency
discretion, the policy choices the court makes will be much more
difficult to anticipate, and the agency's anticipation of the political
direction of the President or Congress becomes less useful. The
policy administrator, fearful of reversal, will narrow his or her pol-
icy options when the court assumes this policy oversight role."
49. Political opposition to the Bumpers Amendment, which would have eliminated
presumptions of validity for agency regulations on review, illustrates the agencies' fear of
potential court policy power. See Hearings on the Regulatory Procedures Act of 1981
Before the House Judiciary Committee, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 751, 898 (1981).
50. For example, the Treasury Department withdrew a wine ingredient labeling rule,
46 Fed. Reg. 55,093 (1981), after extensive pressure from the California wine industry lobby.
Swallow, Administration Corks Up a Regulation That Had the Wine Makers in Ferment,
12 NAT'L J. 1730 (1981). Subsequently, a public interest group challenged the withdrawal of
the ingredient labeling rule. The court found the withdrawal "ill-considered and superfi-
cially explained," but expressly held that a charge that the agency "succumbed to political
pressure" was not a valid objection to a change in a rule. Center for Science in the Public
Interest v. Department of the Treasury, 573 F. Supp. 1186 (D.D.C. 1983) (appeal pending).
51. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 703, 705 (1982). A court also might grant relief under a special
statute from which the agency derived its rulemaking authority. See Environmental Defense
Fund v. EPA, 636 F.2d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
52. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). In several instances statutes require the courts to ap-
ply the substantial evidence standard. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E), (F) (1982). The arbitrariness
standard is still preeminent. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983). An administrative law expert, however, has written about the stan-
dard: "Preeminence has not brought clarity.... [N]one of us has any very good idea what
those words [arbitrary and capricious] mean." Allen, Chairman's Message, 35 An. L. Rzv. at
iii, vi (Spring 1983).
53. The President controls the decisionmaking of Executive Branch agencies as their
principal elected "boss." Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405-06 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The
President, however, does not have the same control over independent agencies. See, e.g.,
United States Senate v. FTC, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
54. When a court takes the policy steering wheel away from an agency and repriori-
tizes the agency's agenda of rulemaking projects, as the court did in the ethylene oxide
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The principal benefit of the Reagan deregulation drive for ad-
ministrative law has been the clarification of how courts should in-
terpret the arbitrariness standard . 5 Because the Supreme Court
expanded the arbitrariness test in 1983 in Motor Vehicles Manu-
facturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Co.,56 deregulation challengers will be able to subject future
agency efforts to deregulate to a more heightened judicial review.
In addition to clarifying the judicial review standard, deregu-
lation by the Reagan Administration has served to single out the
matters that should be left to agency discretion.57 Prior to the de-
regulation cases of the 1980's, Congress had delegated so much dis-
cretion to the agencies in the safety and health fields that choices
were wide open to interpretation and debate and therefore were
virtually unreviewable.58 A set of judicial challenges to agency dis-
cretion and inaction, as illustrated in Chaney v. Heckler,59 began
to alter this approach. Courts today will review challenged'agency
inaction as often as they will review challenged agency action.
The Reagan Administration's use of deregulation has caused
widespread debate about fundamental questions within all three
branches of government. Deregulation has led to a major congres-
sional reexamination of the "arbitrary or capricious" standard of
judicial review.60 Congress has stepped up its use of appropriation
OSHA decision, Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1153-54
(D.C. Cir. 1983), an agency manager is unable to predict the future of a particular program,
despite the agency's wishes.
55. The extensive Reagan Administration effort to revise agency rules has made the
arbitrariness standard clearer. The decisions in cases arising from a review of those efforts,
such as Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856
(1983), have added to the general understanding of the meaning of arbitrariness. See, e.g.,
Allen, supra note 52, at v.
56. 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983); see infra text accompanying notes 165-73.
57. The case law since 1981 has explored the issue of what is a matter of agency dis-
cretion better than that of any other period in the APA's history. See WWHT, Inc. v. FCC,
656 F.2d 807, 816-19 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Since deregulation decisions are so discretion ori-
ented, any judicial review must test the limits of discretion, particularly regarding which
rules to pursue. The common law of judicial review, which formerly treated nonaction more
leniently than action, has been eroded. Ideally the agency should have an important range
of discretion to decide "what an agency wishes to do and not to do, within the broad range
of alternatives available under its charter." Scalia, Chairman's Message, 34 A. L. Rav. at v,
vi (1982).
58. For example, under a statute prohibiting the marketing of drugs not found "safe"
by FDA scientists, 21 U.S.C. § 355(a), (d) (1982), the courts would not reverse the FDA on
its decision.
59. Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1183-90 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (discussed infra notes
78-83 and accompanying text).
60. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982) (scope of judicial review).
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powers as a countermeasure against deregulatory steps. 1 Finally,
the executive branch has chosen to make the issue of deregula-
tion's effectiveness a matter of reelection politics. 6 2
V. DEVICES FOR DEREGULATION
A prerequisite to critiquing the courts' review of deregulation
is an understanding of deregulation's mechanics. A politically ap-
pointed agency head may declare that the agency will deregulate,
but expressing the wish does not make it so.68 To implement de-
regulation the agency management can choose rescission, modifica-
tion of scope, avoidance of a new rule, or some combination of
these options. This part will examine each of these devices from
the intraagency standpoint of what an agency must do in order to
use the particular deregulation method. The judicial review of each
of these devices differs because courts accord each option varying
degrees of deference. Some choices, such as total rescission, are
scrutinized quite closely by the courts, while others, such as the
decision not to adopt a rule, often are deferentially reviewed.
A. Revocation of a Regulation
Revocation-the repeal, modification, or withdrawal of a
rule-commonly occurs when agency management changes either
its policy approach to the problem," its factual assessment of con-
ditions subject to the rule, 5 or its understanding of the statutory
authority.66 Revoking the rule commences with notice that the rule
has been selected for reexamination, or that the agency proposes to
repeal it,67 or that the agency suspends enforcement of the rule
61. Congress has long exercised power, through appropriations, to command agencies
to do or refrain from actions. See W. GELLHORN, C. Bysz & P. STRAuss, AKmmSTRATivz LAW
104-07 (7th ed. 1979).
62. See Office of the Vice-President, Highlights of Regulatory Relief Accomplishments
During the Reagan Administration (Aug. 1983). As the 1984 election nears, regulatory re-
form will be an increasingly important topic. See Kurtz, OMB's Role in Reviewing Federal
Rules Under Debate, Wash. Post, Oct. 9, 1983, at AS, cols. 1-4.
63. Administration managers' policy changes are not self-executing within the agen-
cies; the staff of the agency still must agree to accomplish the political goals.
64. Reviewing courts should grant these policy matters the greatest deference. Mc-
Gowan, supra note 43, at 245.
65. Courts are much less deferential to factual issues than to policy issues. Id.
66. Courts are as good or better than agencies at reinterpreting statutes. Id. Overall,
then, the prudent agency will premise deregulation upon policy grounds.
67. This notice can be found in an agenda of regulations published by the agency on a
periodic basis or in a Federal Register announcement of the proposed revocation.
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and invites comments on the action. 8 An agency sometimes can
declare revocation effective immediately under the exception for
immediately effective rules, but using this exception leaves the
agency vulnerable to criticism concerning its rush to deregulate. 9
The most direct form of deregulation, thus, is also the most
cumbersome.
Revocation constitutes "rulemaking" under the APA.70 Al-
though the lower courts had approached this view, State Farm,1 a
1983 Supreme Court case, settled any remaining disagreements.
The State Farm decision concerned the long-running dispute over
seat belts and passive restraint devices, such as air bags.72 In State
Farm the agency had revoked a regulation requiring air bags in
new cars, ten months before the regulation would have become ef-
fective. The agency defendant, the intervenor automobile makers,
and the plaintiff insurance firms were divided in their views con-
cerning the efficacy of the regulation. Significantly, in State Farm
the Court clearly stated that the deregulatory action of rule with-
drawal must satisfy rulemaking procedures of notice and opportu-
nity for public comment.73 The Court equated the removal of a
rule with the creation of a rule for purposes of identifying the pro-
cedures to be followed in revocation. The Court made it clear
that procedural compliance was essential to a successful rule revo-
cation.75 On remand, therefore, the agency is required to follow all
the necessary procedural steps, but probably will reach the same
substantive result-revocation of the rule.
68. Notice of suspension and the proposed rescission of a rule are usually published
together, for public comment, in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982). Modem agencies
are more aware of the pitfalls of hasty deregulatory action. See Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 816-17 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Council of S. Mountains v.
Donovan, 653 F.2d 573, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
69. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1982). Agency suspension of enforcement should be accompa-
nied by a rulemaking notice regarding rescission. Id.
70. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (1982).
71. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. As'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856, 2867
(1983).
72. The air bags proceeding began in 1967 with seat belt standards and progressed
with politics and technology to the Supreme Court. For an extended discussion, see Graham
& Gorham, NHTSA and Passive Restraints: A Case of Arbitrary and Capricious Deregula-
tion, 35 AD. L. Rav. 193 (1983).
73. State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2865-66.
74. Id. Plaintiff's effort to save the agency's rule was not a specious argument, but the
statutory correlation of several types of actions within "rulemaking," 5 U.S.C. § 551(5)
(1982), made it easy for the Court to set a standard of review higher than "unlawfully with-
held" action. Id. § 706(1).
75. State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2866.
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B. Deregulation Through Modification and Reinterpretation
New managers of an agency sometimes wish to recede from
acquisitions of power accomplished by their predecessors. Aban-
doning or limiting a past position can be difficult. Modification of
the scope of an existing rule can be especially difficult when the
regulation affects a community that is sharply divided over the
wisdom and efficacy of the rule. When an agency strengthens or
weakens the requirements of a rule well-regarded by consumers
but disdained by producers, for example, at least one side is sure
to fight the modification. Most substantive rules have a legislative
scope, and like legislation, they create a constituency with expecta-
tions and a target audience with objections. If the court views the
rule as an embodiment of clear legislative intent, the agency that
seeks to modify the rule will have an uphill battle. In the typical
battle over modification, proponents of the old rule argue that the
legislative body must approve the change, while the agency seeking
changes argues that the legislature delegated choices, not com-
mands, so that the agency maintains the ability to change the
rule.7
6
The courts are influenced by several factors when deciding
whether to accept the withdrawal of past agency positions. New
evidence can justify modification of a fact-specific conclusion.7 7
The legislative direction may depend on a set of facts reflecting a
past stage of scientific knowledge that current scientific knowledge
has altered. Alternatively an agency may concede that it made an
error and claim that it now seeks to correct the past mistake. A
court may defer to the agency because of its desire to allow the
agency to correct flaws in prior rulemaking.
An agency must be sure to modify all relevant aspects of a
rule, including the preamble. In the recent case of Chaney v. Heck-
ler75 the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) attempted modifi-
cation of the scope of a rule was defeated by an "orphan pream-
ble." The FDA had proposed a rule pertaining to prescribing of
drugs for nonapproved uses. In the rule's preamble the FDA had
made several remarks about the agency's general policy on the sub-
76. The resolution of these battles will rest on a court's construction of the agency's
enabling statute. The court must determine whether Congress intended to force a particular
choice on the agency. This process allows a court to alter its statutory construction to fit its
view of the "proper" outcome.
77. New evidence may be required as a basis for reexamining a rule. State Farm, 103
S. Ct. at 2866.
78. 718 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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ject.79 The FDA later withdrew the proposed rule, but failed to
mention the revocation of the general principles contained in the
preamble.3 0 More than ten years later, the District of Columbia
Circuit ruled that the preamble had been a policy statement and
had not been expressly revoked;81 that the preamble had an effect
sufficient to characterize the policy statement as a "rule"; and that
the agency now could not act inconsistently with the past pream-
ble.8 2 If the courts follow the Chaney precedent in other situations,
agencies that have dozens of similar unwithdrawn preamble com-
ments may be barred judicially from making any future policy
modifications. An agency that modifies or withdraws a rule must
be careful to eliminate the past preamble statements as well.83
Another example of the judicial review of rule modification
arose in Interstate Natural Gas Association of America v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission.8 4 In Interstate the plaintiff trade
association challenged the Commission's modification of the defini-
tion of a key term in the Commission's enabling statute. The Com-
mission had changed the definition of "British Thermal Unit"
from the congressional provision in the enabling statute.85 The
term provided the necessary formula for determining the price of
gas.8 The court reversed the Commission's modified definition of
the term.87 In the District of Columbia Circuit's view, Congress
chose one particular scale for measuring heat, and the agency did
not have the power to alter it' s People familiar with Congress'
knowledge of details may doubt that a legislative intent concerning
79. The policy statements concerned limitations on the use of pharmaceuticals for
uses not approved specifically by the FDA. Id. at 1186. The plaintiffs sought to have this
policy applied to impose regulations on the use of lethal drugs in death penalty cases. Id. at
1178-79.
80. Id. at 1186 n.28.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1191-92.
83. Detracting from the precedential value of the Chaney case is the established pro-
cedure of the FDA to treat the preamble as a form of freestanding policy advice, contrary to
the practice of other agencies. 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(d)(1), (e) (1983).
84. 716 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 3301 (1982).
86. Gas heating measurement by British Thermal Units is one of the standard techni-
cal factors used in adjudications by the Commission. Interstate Natural Gas Ass'n of Am. v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 716 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (addressing the statutory
term "btu" in 15 U.S.C. § 3311 (1982)).
87. 716 F.2d at 12.
88. "[H]owever more appealing the dry rule may be to the Commission's sense of sci-
entific aesthetics and accuracy, it is not for the Commission to 'improve' the statutory de-
sign chosen by Congress." Id. at 15.
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as specific a detail as physical measurements of kinetic energy ex-
ists; nonetheless, the court was hostile to the Commission's deregu-
latory action in the face of a relatively clear statutory command.
In contrast to its holding in Interstate, the District of Colum-
bia Circuit upheld an agency's modification of an important stan-
dard in Building & Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO v.
Donovan.s8 A Labor Department rule had revised the standard for
wage setting in federal contracts. Labor union advocates chal-
lenged the modification in court. The trial court, offended by the
agency's unilateral change, ruled that the agency could not modify
a rule based on an interpretation of a statute without new legisla-
tion.90 On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the
trial court and upheld the agency's modification. In an opinion by
former Chief Judge McGowan, the court distinguished between the
agency's interpretation of a statute and the agency's use of dele-
gated discretion. 1 The court would grant slight deference to inter-
pretations of statutory terms; McGowan himself had articulated
that principle in a 1979 address.2 The court, however, could up-
hold a rule premised on the agency's use of long-dormant discre-
tion, and in this case did so. 3 If the agency "had some discretion
to reach a number of different results rather than [acting in] an
area of pure statutory interpretation as to which there is in theory
only a single answer," the agency's action would be upheld.
94
"[L]ittle more than clear statement is required" when the agency
acts in the area of discretion.9 5 One lesson from this case is that
the agency presentation makes an important difference. Deregula-
tion through reinterpretation is in greater jeopardy than deregula-
tion through discretionary choice.9
89. 712 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 975 (1984).
90. Building & Constr. Trades Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Donovan, 543 F. Supp. 1282,
(D.D.C. 1982), rev'd, 712 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 975 (1984).
91. 712 F.2d at 619.
92. "[W]hile courts are at pains to take into account the agency's experienced and
informed reading of statutes, courts speak with some comfort and an authority of their own
on such issues." McGowan, supra note 43, at 245.
93. "The fact that no secretary has previously abandoned the practice does not take
away from the current Secretary's power to fine tune his exercise of discretion." 712 F.2d at
622. In a similar setting, the same circuit in 1978 upheld a rule that the agency derived from
what it said was dormant authority implicit in 1938 legislation. The court found no barrier
to rediscovering that buried treasure of implicit statutory power. National Confectioners
Ass'n v. Califano, 569 F.2d 690, 694 n.1l (D.C. Cir. 1978).
94. 712 F.2d at 619.
95. Id.
96. In Ford Motor Co. v. ICC, 714 F.2d 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the District of Columbia
Circuit found another, yet more amorphous, limitation to an agency's use of deregulatory
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Modification of a rule, rather than outright repeal, is a less
confrontative strategy for a new political leader of an agency. No
agency, however, can make changes in a rule without first consider-
ing the possibility of judicial review.9 7 The illustrative cases sug-
gest that a measured, not a drastic, change, adopted with a pream-
ble claiming discretion to change and avoiding any clearly
statutory requirements for definitions, will most likely succeed.
One of the notable phenomena of agency actions in the period
from 1981 to 1984 has been agency managers' willingness to an-
nounce modifications of prior rules as ideological or political
achievements for the Republican Party's policy of deregulation."'
If a court finds that politics provided the sole motivation for the
modification, the court will reverse the agency.9
C. The Conscious Nonimplementation of a Requirement
An agency can enforce a statute or rule that commands or con-
trols certain private action at any time after its effective date. An
modification. The ICC, as part of its general plan for deregulating the railroad industry, had
changed its method for handling shippers' complaints from an individual procedure to a
class procedure. Responding to a shipper's challenge to the modification, the court held that
even though the modification was within the agency's power, the change must be reversed
because it was not a measured retreat from regulation, but was a drastic change. Id. at 1164-
66.
97. One of the most significant judicial considerations is the need for an adequate
administrative record. A prudent agency should have "a set of procedures for presenting
and organizing that detail [of rulemaking factual support] in a principled way before a rule
is promulgated." Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 35, 74
(1975).
98. Vice-President Bush, in announcing certain rule modifications, said: "To date it is
estimated that these actions will result in a total of approximately $150 billion being saved
... which can now be used for new jobs, investment and research and development." Letter
from Vice-President Bush to the Author (Aug. 11, 1983) (accompanying booklet on High-
lights of Regulatory Relief Accomplishment During the Reagan Administration (Aug.
1983)).
99. Political influence in rulemaking is not forbidden, of course, and many courts con-
sider the practice legitimate so long as the agency does not violate the APA. See, e.g., Sierra
Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Cutler, Panel. Managing the
Regulatory Process, 32 AD. L. Rav. 239, 243 (1980); Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and the
Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395, 1411-12 (1975); Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative
Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 943, 988 (1980). The
mere desire to end a politically undesirable regulation is not a factually supportable basis
for a rulemaking. Even policy changes require adequate support. Part of the problem may
be that the political claims for the Reagan Administration deregulation actions are more
extreme than those made in past administrations, while the reviewing courts receiving ap-
peals from the deregulation include more than 200 judges appointed by former President
Carter from 1977 through 1980. See ADMmismAT v OFFICE OF U.S. CouRTs, ANNUAL RE-
PORT OF THE DIRECTOR 3 (1981).
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agency, however, may attempt deregulation through a policy of
conscious nonenforcement of the target statutes or rules. Deregula-
tion through nonenforcement is different from the prosecutorial
discretion to select cases for adjudication. In challenges to adjudi-
cation, a court usually will not review closely the means by which
the agency selected its targets, but the choice itself is reviewable
on grounds of arbitrariness. 100 In Dunlop v. Bachowski'0 the Su-
preme Court held that a court may review an agency's failure to
take action when properly requested. In Dunlop the Labor Depart-
ment had refused to take action upon a union member's complaint.
The Supreme Court, siding with the aggrieved member, allowed
courts to demand a statement of the agency's reasons for its deci-
sion not to bring an enforcement case. 02
The deregulating agency may make a qualitative choice to do
less extensive interpretation of a statutory command or a quantita-
tive choice to decrease the number of enforcement inspections and
other actions.10 3 The former choice is subtler, and merely requires
top management to veto specific cases. Opponents can attack such
nonaction only after a pattern or practice develops. The latter is a
visible budget choice, but the agency can defend the decrease as a
fiscal rather than an ideological decision.10 4 An agency's deregu-
latory choice under either approach is often controversial. 0 5 Gov-
100. Prosecutorial discretion in case selection is reviewable for "abuse of discretion." 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). An agency's decision to file complaints generally is not review-
able. See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232 (1980). Likewise, the decision to com-
mence a court enforcement action probably will not be reviewed before initiation of the
action. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1950).
101. 421 U.S. 560 (1975).
102. Id. at 571. In reversing a broader principle set by the lower court, the Supreme
Court allowed the courts to remand if the agency inadequately disclosed its reasons, but the
Court cautioned that the agency's nonenforcement decision would be reversed if it were so
irrational that it could be considered arbitrary. Id. at 575.
103. "Regulations impose no costs and produce no benefits if they are not enforced
and complied with. . . even if new regulations continued. . . with the same potential im-
pact as in previous years-relief could be provided through relaxation in enforcement." R.
LITAN & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 7, at 126.
104. A reduced budget as a result of reduced enforcement may be the underlying goal
of Reagan administration deregulation. Id. at 126-28.
105. Controversy arose, for example, when the Department of Agriculture attempted
to decrease the number of inspections at meat plants. See USDA Considering Modifications
of Noncontinuous Inspection Bill, FooD CHEmicAL NEws, Sept. 6, 1982, at 3. Similarly, the
FDA was criticized for its reduction in prosecution and seizure actions under the Reagan
Administration. In 1977 the FDA conducted 32 prosecutions, issued 40 injunctions, and ini-
tiated 530 seizure actions. In 1981 the FDA conducted 18 prosecutions, issued 13 injunc-
tions, and initiated 276 seizure actions. Food and Drug Administration, Statistics on En-
forcement Actions Update, Talk Paper T82-89 (Dec. 6, 1982).
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ernmental deregulation through conscious nonenforcement of ex-
isting rules also is not as desirable from the viewpoint of the
regulated community as is elimination of the rules. 08 The steel-
maker does not benefit, except in the short term, from the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency's nonenforcement of water emission
standards by decreasing monthly inspections. 107 The standards still
exist and the enforcement penalty exposure continues. The incho-
ate risk always is present because the regulator may select a firm
as a target at any time. When the keeper of the arsenal changes,
the arsenal remains fully equipped, and if the old administrator
was ousted for inaction, the new keeper of the arsenal will be likely
to overreact in favor of enforcement.
Courts are less likely to overturn conscious nonenforcement
than they are to overturn revocation or modification. Challengers
seek to control conscious nonenforcement through section 706(1) of
the APA, which provides for judicial review of an agency's failure
or refusal to act."08 The Supreme Court in State Farm differenti-
ated between this type of failure to act and a rescission of a com-
pleted rule.10 This distinction should not be obscured; clearly,
plaintiffs will find it a more difficult task to challenge inaction than
to attack a particular Federal Register announcement."0
One can draw an analogy between failure to enforce a rule and
mandamus relief in equity. The mandamus writ would lie when an
officer failed to carry out a ministerial duty, but the writ was not
available to command the performance of a discretionary action."
106. Governmental elimination of active enforcement alleviates some exposure to pen-
alties in the short term, but increases the cost disadvantage to full compliance firms in
comparison to less responsible competitors. For a discussion of the economic effects of the
decline in rule enforcement, see R. LITAN & W. NoRDHAUS, supra note 7, at 126.
107. Large capital equipment and maintenance expenditures will remain unaffected by
the frequency of the agency's inspectional visits. The change in inspections may affect the
volume of paperwork and the frequency of fines, but this decrease is unlikely to be signifi-
cant in overall compliance costs.
108. A court can review action "unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed." 5
U.S.C. § 706(1) (1982); see Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
min., 710 F.2d 842, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Note, Judicial Review of Administrative Inaction,
83 COLUM. L. REV. 627, 636 (1983).
109. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856,
2866 (1983).
110. The inactive agency always can assert that it has not yet taken final action. This
barrier of ripeness is sometimes difficult to overcome. See, e.g., Center for Auto Safety v.
National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 7.10 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Scalia, Rulemaking
as Politics, 34 AD. L. REV. No. 3, at v, vii (1982).
111. The federal statutory cause of mandamus has replaced the writ of mandamus.
Pub. L. No. 87-748, 76 Stat. 744 (1962) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976)); see In re
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A court will examine an agency's failure to enforce a rule by first
reviewing the type of command Congress imposed upon the
agency. If the court finds that Congress delegated complete discre-
tion to the agency for either part of the choice or the total pro-
gram, then the court, as in mandamus, will deny relief.11
D. Failure to Promulgate an Arguably Required Regulation
One could theorize that an agency which did not choose to
promulgate a rule would receive great judicial deference, but re-
cent cases indicate that the more the agency has done toward
rulemaking, before choosing not to adopt a rule, the less likely the
court is to allow the agency to stop.118 The agency manager wishing
to stop a regulation before it becomes "official" faces a dilemma.
Past experience suggests that courts routinely would uphold aban-
donment of a rule for sound, discretionary reasons of resource pri-
orities, except when Congress has ordered mandatory adoption of
the rule; but modern political friction among agencies, Congress,
the President, and potential litigants makes the termination of a
rulemaking much more difficult. For example, a court may impose
an abandoned Carter Administration project upon the reluctant
Reagan Administration if the court finds that the prior rule was
developed so fully in the record that abandonment only could be
capricious."'
An agency interested in deregulating can decide not to initiate
rulemaking procedures. A supporter of the rule in question can file
Appeal of FTC Line of Business Reporting, 595 F.2d 685, 704-05 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 958 (1979). Mandamus by statute, however, is not available to compel dis-
cretionary action. See Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of
1962 and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 308, 319-20 (1967).
112. The APA precludes review of the limited class of cases in which "agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982). This narrow class of
actions, however, is rarely encountered in typical administrative decisionmaking. See Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
113. A claim that the decision not to promulgate a rule is a valid exercise of agency
discretion will not shield the agency since "the judgment whether or not to pursue a particu-
lar area or manner of regulation ceases to be a political judgment once regulation has been
initially imposed." Scalia, supra note 110, at vii; see also, Public Citizen Health Research
Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1158-59 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (court reversed agency's refusal to
regulate and ordered reprioritization of the agency's rulemaking projects).
114. See Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1158 (D.C.
Cir. 1983). If the agency has rescinded a rule capriciously, the court may demand that the
agency quickly announce the future date on which the rule again will be effective. See




a petition demanding the issuance of the rule under section 553(e)
of the APA, and the agency must answer and provide reasons sup-
porting its nonactivity.115 The decision not to regulate is a
"nonregulatory" decision, something conceptually distinguishable
from deregulation. Unlike the nonenforcement option,118 a chal-
lenge to the agency's deregulatory choice to forego the issuance of
a rule often arises from a previous request for rulemaking by the
party who is challenging the agency in court.
11 7
As a general rule, courts will accept an agency decision not to
institute a rulemaking proceeding. The District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, however, closely scrutinizes the omission of a rule if the chal-
lenger asserts that the agency failed to comply with a statute. The
District of Columbia Circuit requires the agency to show "reasoned
decision making" in its rulemaking denial.11
The District of Columbia Circuit articulated its "scrutiny"
standard in a 1979 case concerning a proposed requirement in se-
curities disclosure rules.119 The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) has discretion to require public corporations to make
disclosures of information to the investing public. The court up-
held the choice of the SEC not to adopt special disclosure rules on
environmental and social issues as a matter of reasonable agency
discretion. The court found that the decision considered both the
exercise of statutory discretion and a procedurally adequate
record.
12 0
In more recent cases, the District of Columbia Circuit has de-
veloped law in the inaction category. The court appears to ap-
proach agency inaction in economic regulation deferentially, while
closely examining agency inaction in health and safety regulation.
115. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(e), 555(e) (1982). These sections govern petitions-the former for
filing, the latter for responding. See J. O'RELLY, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING § 17.01
(1983); see generally M. Asimow, ADVICE TO THE PUBLIC FROM FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES (1973).
116. See supra notes 100-12 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1152
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Center for Science in the Public Interest v. Department of the Treasury,
513 F. Supp. 1168 (D.D.C. 1983).
118. See Public Systems Health Research Group v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 709 F.2d 73, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United States v. FCC, 707 F.2d 610, 618 (D.C.
Cir. 1983); Professional Drivers Council v. Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, 706 F.2d 1216,
1222 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
119. Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1047-49 (D.C. Cir.
1979).
120. Id. If the record had not been adequate, the court would have required remand to
the agency for reconsideration of the petition through proper procedural steps. Id.
19841
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
When the communications industry challenged the Federal Com-
munications Commission's refusal to adopt certain international
communications rules, for instance, the court accepted the agency's
nonaction decision. 1 1 The same circuit, however, closely scruti-
nizes most challenges asserting safety or health grounds for pro-
mulgation. 121 In fact, the court has gone as far as requiring new
schedules and new requirements for rulemaking in cases concern-
ing an agency's failure to regulate polychlorinated biphenyls 12 3 and
ethylene oxide. ' 2 These cases illustrate a novel and very intrusive
form of judicial review. An agency, therefore, must be careful not
to delay health related regulations, or it risks a reprioritization of
its rulemaking agenda by the courts.
Another new trend suggests that the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit regards inaction itself as "rulemaking."' 25 The most extreme
case of nonadoption was the circuit's finding in Center for Auto
Safety. 2 6 The court held that the agency, which had a set time
period within which to make a certain rulemaking choice, had
made a "rule" when it did not make a choice within the period.
27
The statutory delegation related to automobile fuel economy. Sim-
ilar to most modern regulatory statutes, Congress adopted a tech-
nology-forcing target that was governed by a specified schedule for
fuel economy improvements.' 28 The statute provided that the
Transportation Department could adopt interim fuel economy
rules, but the rules had to be adopted before a set date in order to
affect certain car model years. The agency failed to promulgate any
rules by the given date. The court treated the agency's choice not
to act as an action for which a comprehensive record of public par-
ticipation was required. The District of Columbia Circuit com-
pelled the agency to make its choice of inaction upon the same
121. See ITT World Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 699 F.2d 1219, 1245-46 (D.C. Cir.
1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 334 (1984). But see Geller v. FCC, 610 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (an example of an older, less deferential case).
122. See, e.g., Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150 (D.C.
Cir. 1983); Note, supra note 108, at 628-29.
123. See Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 636 F.2d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
124. Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
see also Note, supra note 108, at 633-37.
125. See WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Natural Resources De-
fense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Scalia, supra note 110, at vii.
126. Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 710 F.2d 842
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
127. Id. at 848-49.
128. Id. at 847 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2002 (1982)).
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criteria as it would employ in actual rulemaking. 129
E. Stays of Effectiveness
An agency can deregulate by staying the effective date of a
rule, thereby precluding enforcement of the rule. 30 If the agency
stays the effective date, the agency rule is in suspended animation,
while proponents of the rule can challenge the agency delay by
seeking judicial review of the stay.' 13
When an agency stays a rule rather than modifying or with-
drawing it, the agency action has a temporal dimension-ending on
the date the agency chooses to remove the stay or modify the rule.
Quite often, a ripeness issue arises. 13 2 A challenger seeks review of
the stay, and the agency responds that the court should not con-
sider the action until the agency officially withdraws the rule for
repromulgation with modifications. 33 Courts with crowded calen-
dars of "active" administrative reviews may dismiss stay challenges
in order to avoid wasting time on unripe controversies.
Unlike other means of deregulation, a stay freezes final action
already taken.134 A rule that the agency has defended successfully
in the courts in one administration may later be the subject of a
stay. 3 5 Once-victorious proponents of the adoption of the rule can
129. Id. This judicially created requirement converted the procedural posture for re-
view from one of unlawfully withheld action, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1982), to action chosen but
with insufficient legal basis, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
130. If an agency stays the effective date of a rule, the final rule is not enforceable
until that time. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1982).
131. The stay constitutes "action," and since it is withheld to the detriment of the
person seeking the rule, it may be appealed. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1982). This includes both actual
stays, Environmental Defense Fund v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1983), and
constructive stays (actions having the net effect of a stay), Union of Concerned Scientists v.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 711 F.2d 370, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1983). This type of stay authority
is distinguishable from the power of a court to stay a rule that an agency wishes to make
effective. See 5 U.S.C. § 705 (1982); see, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136
(1967).
132. A lack of ripeness claim challenges the appropriateness of judicial review at the
current stage of the controversy. See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,
148-51 (1967); J. O'REuLxy, supra note 115, § 14.08; see generally Fuchs, Prerequisites to
Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action, 51 IND. L.J. 817, 819-59 (1976).
133. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 815 (D.C. Cir.
1983); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 761-65 (3d Cir. 1982);
Council of S. Mountains v. Donovan, 653 F.2d 573 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see generally 4 K. DA-
vis, AI~ sTRATIW LAw TREATISE § 25:13 (2d ed. 1983).
134. See Council of S. Mountains v. Donovan, 653 F.2d 573, 576-79, 582 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
135. The Reagan Administration, immediately upon assuming office, ordered a stay
action for all new and pending rules. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
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challenge the stay of that final rule. From the perspective of a suc-
cessful advocate for the rule, the agency's grant of a stay after the
close of rulemaking is a bitter disappointment, "seizing defeat
from the jaws of victory."
Very few recent cases discuss the judicial review of stays. A
pending case, however, may clarify many of the issues pertaining
to the judicial review of stays.13 6 The pending case concerns rules
that the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration
(NHTSA) promulgated on tire quality grading.13 7 In an earlier
case, a tire manufacturer challenged these rules as inconsistent,
citing varied test results. The court, however, upheld the rules af-
ter acknowledging that the agency testing procedures for the rules
minimized variability of results.13 8
The pending suit arose when the agency placed a stay on the
effectiveness of the rule. The agency suspended the final rule in
February 1983, announcing that the accuracy and reliability of the
tests were not as good as expected and that the rule therefore
might mislead consumers. 3 9 The pending suit charges that the sus-
pension by stay was arbitrary. Since the agency utilized a rulemak-
ing procedure in issuing the stay, however, it probably has satisfied
at least one of the judicial review elements that previously have led
to reversal.
14 0
The NHTSA may experience trouble on review because of the
"deja vu" quality of the challenge. The court has already heard the
agency justify its tire quality grading rule14 and is unlikely to be
patient with later contradictory arguments justifying suspension of
the rule. Unless new information or a significant error may be
shown, an agency will encounter difficulty in justifying the stay of
a hard fought rule.
Successful agency opposition in judicial review of a stayed rule
is unlikely when "constructive rescission" is present. The District
of Columbia Circuit has been most active in recent "constructive
rescission" actions. The court's approach, expressed in a hazardous
136. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. Sneed, No. 83-1327 (pending D.D.C. 1983).
137. 49 C.F.R. § 575.104 (1982), withdrawn, 48 Fed. Reg. 5690 (1983).
138. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Department of Transp., 541 F.2d 1178, 1186-89 (6th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 930 (1977), on later appeal, 592 F.2d 322 (6th Cir. 1979).
139. 48 Fed. Reg. 5690 (1983).
140. The agency initially proposed the stay, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,084 (1982), in an attempt
to avoid a remand for further procedures under an expansive view of the term
"rulemaking."
141. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Department of Transp., 541 F.2d 1178, 1191 (6th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 930 (1977), on later appeal, 592 F.2d 322 (6th Cir. 1979).
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waste case, indicates its close scrutiny of health or safety related
deregulation attempts.142 Sometimes the agency's behavior before
the stay establishes a form of estoppel against the agency. In a re-
cent nuclear power plant license case the regulatory agency re-
quired certain compliance steps subject to strict deadlines.1 43 Al-
though this license amendment process could not be defined as
rulemaking under the APA,144 the District of Columbia Circuit
held that the agency's practice of staying the deadlines required
the agency to provide an "opportunity for public comment when it
became necessary to change those [license] deadlines.
'1 45
In general, a court will examine a stay more carefully than a
mid-process correction or a refusal to act. The stay reverses final
agency action, suspends a public protection, and is therefore sub-
jected to tougher scrutiny.1 46 A form of estoppel arises. The real
concern that courts must address is the extent to which estoppel
concepts may be introduced into the modern administrative
rulemaking system before these concepts inflict it with arthritis. If
the courts require an overly high level of proof to justify deregula-
tion, rules will become immutable, perpetual requirements.
F. The Choice of Adjudication Rather Than Rulemaking
As the process of rulemaking becomes more encumbered, can
an agency simply deregulate through adjudication? There are two
answers. If a rule was already in place, the agency cannot "sweep
away" the rule by an adjudicated decision.1 47 If the rule was not in
place, however, the agency can alter its policy by quasi-judicial ac-
tion.1 48 Many agencies can-and do-use adjudication as a safety
142. If a decision to defer an environmental permitting process "effectively suspends
the implementation" of a standard, that is "rulemaking." Environmental Defense Fund v.
Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 711 F.2d 370, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
143. Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 711 F.2d at 380.
144. The rulemaking definition excludes licensing. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (1982) (li-
censing is an adjudicatory process). Since nuclear plant licensing is unique to modern ad-
ministrative procedure, the analogy to rulemaking is tenuous. See Tourtellotte, Nuclear Li-
censing Litigation: Come On In, The Quagmire is Fine, 33 AD. L. Ray. 367, 387-91 (1981).
145. Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 711 F.2d at 383.
146. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 816-17 (D.C.
Cir. 1983); Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 711 F.2d at 383
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Council of S. Mountains v. Donovan, 653 F.2d 573, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
147. The rulemaking process, however, may not answer every question. In
nonrulemaking cases an adjudication could fill the interstices. Difficulties arise when an
agency treats an adjudication as if it were a rule, and then later attempts to change the
policy. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
148. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974).
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valve for rapidly evolving policy decisions.
Soon after the adoption of the APA, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that adjudication remained a viable option for the an-
nouncement of new policies and that a court should not compel
rulemaking if the agency held adjudicatory power and exercised it
prudently.149 The Court in Chenery found that the "informed dis-
cretion of the administrative agency" in choosing its procedural
devices could be used to select a policy creation device other than
rulemaking.150 Chenery, a 1947 decision, set the pace for the SEC,
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and other primarily
investigative and adjudicative bodies. Chenery was also the pre-
mise for NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.,151 a 1974 case that upheld
the NLRB's discretionary choice to use adjudication to alter the
definition of a key statutory exception. The Court noted in Bell
Aerospace that rulemaking offered a forum for collecting "in-
formed views" of commentators "before embarking on a new
course." 152 The Court held, however, that when the adjudication
process would produce similar relevant information for the agency
and give the respondents most affected a full opportunity to be
heard, the agency could choose adjudication. These two Supreme
Court cases, recognizing that agencies might choose to do more ad-
judicating, do not indicate that any particular agency will do less
deregulatory rulemaking. Both Chenery and Bell Aerospace were
test cases concerning changes in interpretations: neither concerned
direct removal of an agency power or policy as a "pure" deregula-
tion by rule.
Agencies now accustomed to rulemaking will not voluntarily
move back to adjudication. Agencies do not wish to lose the na-
tional attention, wider scope of deterrence, and increased public
participation that rulemaking permits. For successful adjudication,
an agency must impose a harsh penalty that will generate attention
and deter future similar misconduct. Because the defendant has
more incentive to appeal a harsh penalty, adjudications are vulner-
149. The function of filling in the interstices of the Act should be performed, as
much as possible, through this quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in
the future. But any rigid requirement to that effect would make the administrative
process inflexible and incapable of dealing with many of the specialized problems
which arise. ... In performing its important functions... an administrative agency
must be equipped to act either by general rule or by individual order.
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947).
150. Id. at 203.
151. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
152. Id. at 295.
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able to unexpected results on review.153 Another adjudicatory
problem is the unlikelihood that the same agency managers or suc-
cessors with identical ideological views will be in charge of the
agency when the case finally works its way through the appellate
courts. 154 Worst of all, the agency management may invest its
funds in adjudicating toward a particular principled outcome and
then find that the evidence gathering process or a factual glitch in
the record causes the case to fall without a resolution on the
merits.
At least one circuit has responded to agency adjudication by
rejecting adjudicatory attempts to set policy and requiring formal
rulemaking procedures. The Ninth Circuit, in two recent cases, has
held that an agency may not use adjudication to establish new law.
In Ford Motor (Francis Ford),55 the Ninth Circuit rejected a Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC) consumer protection decision con-
cerning auto repossession. 5  The FTC had concluded that the ap-
plicable Uniform Commercial Code provision was unfair to
consumers. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the FTC and
held that the agency "must proceed by rulemaking if it seeks to
change the law and establish rules of widespread application.1
1 57
The court cited the Supreme Court's observation in Bell Aero-
space that "there may be situations where the [agency's] reliance
153. For example, the agency inspection that led to the damaging evidence in the
hearing might be excluded as the result of a later constitutional challenge that would force
dismissal of the case. The precedent selection process must take into account the risks of
losing a case because of the loss of the specific case's factual portion.
154. The tenure of agency heads is usually significantly less than the time period con-
sumed by the full adjudication process. See, e.g., Porter, The Federal Trade Commission v.
The Oil Industry: An Autopsy on the Commission's Shared Monopoly Case Against the
Nation's Eight Largest Oil Companies, 27 AmTrRusT BuLL. 753 (1982); The FTC's Cereal
Fiasco: 'Congress Won't Let Us Bust 'Em, Up,' 13 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV., No. 2, 1981,
at 57.
155. Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 358
(1982).
156. Respondent car dealer Francis Ford had repossessed cars sold on credit on which
the buyer had defaulted. Pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), Francis Ford
had credited the wholesale value of the car to the buyer, and then had sold the car and kept
the total price received, even if it was above the wholesale price. This method of accounting
for repossession proceeds, although not explicitly set out in the UCC, is industry practice.
Id. at 1010; see U.C.C. § 9-504 (1981). The FTC case attacked that interpretation of the
statutory provision. The FTC order, if it had been enforced, would have invalidated por-
tions of many states' laws that had followed that interpretation.
157. Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d at 1009. The court also found relevant the fact
that the FTC had considered a trade rule on credit practices that could have covered this




on adjudication would amount to an abuse of discretion,' 1 58 and
held that the instant use of adjudication constituted an abuse of
discretion. The Ninth Circuit determined that an agency should
use adjudication only when condemning discrete violations of ex-
isting law, but that an agency must use rulemaking when seeking
to alter a legal rule followed in virtually every state.159
More recently in Montgomery Ward Co. v. FTC,160 the Ninth
Circuit further refined the limitation on the use of adjudication to
change policy. The court found that the FTC had changed the
meaning of one of its credit rules in order to find Montgomery
Ward guilty of a violation. The court held that this type of rule
amendment must be accomplished by rulemaking and that the
FTC's use of adjudication was an abuse of discretion.16' Agencies
6 2
and commentators'" have criticized the Ninth Circuit's approach
to use of adjudication as an agency policy tool. The principle of
requiring rulemaking for major changes in settled practices is in-
consistent with both Chenery and Bell Aerospace, but only time
will determine how the Supreme Court and the other circuits re-
spond to these Ninth Circuit developments. In the meantime adju-
dication remains as a questionable deregulatory option for an
agency.
VI. THE State Farm DECISION AND ITS EFFECT ON FUTURE
DEREGULATION DECISIONS OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
The Supreme Court spoke directly to the practice and theory
of due process in deregulation in its recent decision, Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Co.'" The Court stridently reaffirmed the application of
the APA's "arbitrary and capricious" review standard 6 5 to an
158. Id. at 1009 (quoting NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974)).
159. Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d at 1009-10.
160. 691 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1982).
161. "An adjudicatory restatement of the rule becomes an amendment, however, if the
restatement so alters the requirements of the rule that the regulated party had inadequate
notice of the required conduct." Id. at 1329; see also Bahramizadeh v. Immigration & Natu-
ralization Serv., 717 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1983) (agency cannot nullify wording of a rule by
adjudicatory interpretation); Ruangswang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 591 F.2d
39 (9th Cir. 1978) (agency cannot add a requirement to a rule by adjudication).
162. See, e.g., Agency's Brief to the Ninth Circuit Seeking Rehearing En Banc, No. 79-
7647 (9th Cir. 1982).
163. See, e.g., 2 K. DAvis, A .uNIsTRATr LAW TRATISE § 7:25, at 179-82 (Supp.
1982).
164. 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983).
165. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
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agency's decision to revoke a rule by construing the Act's definition
of "rulemaking"'16 to include revocation of a rule. The Court held
that action to rescind an agency rule is to be judged by the arbi-
trary and capricious review standard even when the rule being re-
scinded is within the "informal rule" category. 8 7 The Court stated
that the reviewing court should search out a reasoned analysis and
satisfactory explanation for the agency's rule withdrawal. The re-
viewing court must look for the agency's consideration of the rele-
vant factors and must reverse the agency if the agency committed
a clear error of judgment.1
6 8
State Farm suggests that rapid decisions to deregulate espe-
cially those which reject an argument concerning technological al-
ternatives, will be subjected to stricter standards of review. State
Farm, like the decision five years earlier in Vermont Yankee Nu-
clear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,16 9
has generated important "food for thought" for agencies consider-
ing the removal of their rules. Ultimately, State Farm will be as
important for rule withdrawal actions as Vermont Yankee was for
additional procedures "supplementing the record" in informal
rulemaking proceedings. State Farm also is significant because it
illustrates the heightened scrutiny that the courts will apply to
agency actions affecting safety regulations. An agency must take
special care in articulating its reasons for removing a safety based
rule.17 0 In State Farm the agency decided to revoke its rule requir-
ing air bags as passive restraint features in new cars. Part of the
agency's rationale in withdrawing the rule stemmed from the in-
creased costs associated with the installation of air bags.' 7 ' The
Court found the predominately economic rationale for deregulating
inappropriate for an agency to which Congress had delegated
safety authority.7 2 Of course, cost versus safety debates in
rulemaking contexts comparable to that of the air bags regulations
are inevitable. In the aftermath of State Farm, however, agencies
will have to be careful in documenting their basis for deregulation
decisions.7M The agency must take special care when commenta-
166. Id. § 551(5).
167. See State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2865.
168. Id. at 2867; see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 416 (1971).
169. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
170. State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2866.
171. See Graham & Gorham, supra note 72, at 234-35.
172. See State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2870.
173. "[A]n agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a
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tors press technological alternatives upon the agency for enhance-
ment of safety goals, but agency managers chose to reject them.
This part will explore in more detail the State Farm decision and
its ramifications.
A. The Regulation
In the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
1966,174 Congress directed the Secretary of Transportation to de-
velop standards for vehicle safety. According to the Act, standards
"shall be practicable, shall meet the need for motor vehicle safety,
and shall be stated in objective terms. ' 176 The agency must con-
sider "relevant" and "available" data and the "extent to which
such standards will contribute to carrying out the purposes" of the
Act.176 Pursuant to this Act, the Secretary issued the first seat belt
regulation, Motor Vehicle Standard 209, in 1967.177 Many technical
issues and political controversies concerning costs, feasibility for
industry, and net public benefits ensued during the sixteen years
between promulgation and the challenge to the standard's rescis-
sion in the State Farm litigation. Over the years, the agency made
several politically sensitive decisions, reconsiderations, and modifi-
cations. When challengers sought judicial review of these decisions,
the courts generally deferred to the agency by upholding its safety
oriented rules.178 The particular decision at issue in State Farm
was the agency's rescission, ten months before the standard was to
go into effect, of the revised Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Stan-
dard 208, which set forth automatic crash protection
requirements. 
17
B. The District of Columbia Circuit Decision
In 1981 the Reagan Administration decided to rescind the air
bags rule, in part because of the massive economic difficulties ex-
perienced by the American automobile industry. Automobile insur-
ers, who had long favored better auto crash restraints, challenged
reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency does
not act in the first instance." Id. at 2866.
174. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1982).
175. Id. § 1392(a).
176. Id. § 1392(f).
177. See 32 Fed. Reg. 2408 (1967).
178. See Graham & Gorham, supra note 72, at 193.
179. See 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419 (1981).
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the rescission. 180 The Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association de-
fended the rescission by asserting that the proper standard of judi-
cial review for refusals initially to promulgate a rule was that of
APA section 706(1).181 On the petition for review of the rescission
action, the District of Columbia Circuit found that the standard of
"arbitrariness" review under section 706(2)(A) applied.82 The
court reversed the rescission. The court found that rescission in
this case was "a paradigm of arbitrary and capricious agency ac-
tion" because the evidence failed to support the decision and be-
cause the agency had "artifically narrowed the range of alterna-
tives available to it under its legislative mandate."188
The District of Columbia Circuit's reading of legislative dis-
cussions about auto safety requirements and air bags was unique
among modern appellate opinions-perhaps because the judge
writing for the panel had been an active congressional participant
before becoming a judge.18 4 The court drew an inference of legisla-
tive support for air bags from a number of reports, legislative
speeches, and other indicia of congressional intent short of actual
legislation.18 5 The Supreme Court criticized this portion of the
lower court opinion and may have left it with little or no preceden-
tial value. 88 The Supreme Court, however, shared the District of
Columbia Circuit's opinion concerning the appropriate standard of
review.187 The circuit court applied an "arbitrary and capricious"
standard because its reading of the evidence of potential future
benefits from the air bag rule was contrary to the agency's read-
ing. 88 The court stated that "only a well justified refusal to seek
180. The National Association of Independent Insurers and State Farm Insurance
Company challenged the rescission because of their belief that the rule would reduce their
payments to persons injured in automobile collisions. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Department of Transp., 680 F.2d 206, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983).
181. Id. Other parties joining the case were the New York State Insurance Depart-
ment, the Automobile Owners Action Council, and Consumer Alert on the side opposing
repeal, and the Automobile Importers of America and Pacific Legal Foundation on the side
of the agency.
182. 680 F.2d at 220 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
183. 680 F.2d at 208-09.
184. Judge Mikva before his appointment to the District of Columbia Circuit in 1979
had served as a congressman for four years.
185. 680 F.2d at 222-30.
186. See infra text accompanying notes 231-41.
187. See infra text accompanying notes 193-203.
188. 680 F.2d at 231. More commonly, a court will accord deference to the operating
agency in its judgment about future statistical incidence of a fact within the agency's juris-
diction. See, e.g., Ashland Exploration v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 631 F.2d 817,
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more evidence could render rescission non-arbitrary."189 In this in-
stance the agency had rested its decision to rescind the rule upon
"substantial uncertainty," and the court found no justification for
the agency's failure to seek more evidence before making its deci-
sion. The agency "went one step further than reason can support"
when it relied on controversial estimates in rescinding the rule. 190
The District of Columbia Circuit directed future agencies in
similar rescission actions first to make a "reasoned and good faith
effort to consider alternative means of advancing the agency's pur-
pose," and then to support the rescission with rational explana-
tion.19 1 The court's strongly worded criticism of the agency made
headlines and led to significant controversy. The District of Co-
lumbia Circuit's opinion confronted the Supreme Court with an
unusually difficult test of judicial review powers and with one of
the Court's first test cases on the deregulation movement. 192
C. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court upheld the portion of the lower court de-
cision that invalidated the rescission but discarded much of the
circuit court's analytical basis for its decision.1 93 The Court first
addressed several basic administrative law matters before it
reached the actual rescission at issue.
The automobile manufacturers argued before the Supreme
Court that a rule revocation should be judged by the section 706(1)
standard that applies when an agency refuses to adopt a rule.
194
The Court, however, found that the agency's enabling statute
could not support this argument. More importantly, the Court
stated that revocation is substantially different from nonadoption
because "[r]evocation constitutes a reversal of the agency's former
views as to the proper course. 1 9 5 The Court held that the arbitrar-
iness standard of section 706(2)(A) was the proper test to apply to
822-23 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
189. 680 F.2d at 232.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 240.
192. State Farm was the first major administrative law case precipitated by the Rea-
gan Administration's deregulation efforts to reach the Supreme Court.
193. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856
(1983).
194. Id. at 2866 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1982)).
195. State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2865-66. A factor in the Court's analysis not generally
applicable to all deregulation cases is that the vehicle safety statute expressly equated re-
voking with establishing safety rules. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(b) (1982).
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a rescission. 19 The Court seems to have established that the stan-
dard of review for revocation is the arbitrariness standard unless
some statute expressly provides for a different standard. 197 The
Court also held that for an agency's rule revocation decision to sur-
vive an arbitrariness challenge, the record must show a "reasoned
analysis for the change." ' The Court in State Farm extended the
reasoning of two of its earlier cases, Vermont Yankee, 19  a
landmark 1978 decision, and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, °° the 1971 pioneer case for modern judicial review of
administrative action. State Farm is not factually comparable to
Vermont Yankee, but both decisions chastise the errant District of
Columbia Circuit for placing too many procedural demands on an
agency.201 State Farm is not written on as blank an administrative
slate as the Court's decision in Overton Park, but both cases re-
quire the agency to provide a fuller explanation of its decisionmak-
ing process. 20 2 The continuity of the Supreme Court's analysis
from its earlier cases to State Farm is an important stabilizing fea-
ture of the opinion as agencies try to implement the Court's com-
mands. Both the circuit court and the Supreme Court faulted the
agency's weaknesses. The circuit, however, broke numerous unwrit-
ten rules in its heated attack against the agency by using sharp
terms, by relying on the moods and feelings of Congress, and by its
remand order. It would be virtually impossible for an agency man-
ager to comply with the lessons of the District of Columbia Cir-
196. State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2866 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982)).
197. State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2866. For example, an agency's enabling statute could
provide that the decision to revoke a rule must be supported by "substantial evidence on
the record taken as a whole." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982).
198. State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2866. This definition of arbitrariness is easier to satisfy
than the circuit court's vague definition keyed to the failure to seek more evidence. See
supra text accompanying notes 188-89. The Supreme Court's definition, however, is in
agreement with other District of Columbia Circuit precedent. See, e.g., United States v.
FCC, 707 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Professional Drivers Council v. Bureau of Motor Carrier
Safety, 706 F.2d 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
199. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519 (1978), cited in State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2870.
200. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). This was the first Supreme Court case to explore judicial
review of discretionary agency action.
201. The Supreme Court criticized the District of Columbia Circuit's requirement for
additional agency procedures in Vermont Yankee just as it later criticized the circuit's re-
quirement that an agency interpret and follow legislative debates in State Farm. Interest-
ingly, the circuit was aware of the Court's earlier criticism. See Scalia, Vermont Yankee:
The APA, The D.C. Circuit, and The Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 345.
202. Overton Park's holding found the absence of an explanation for an agency's
choice to build a road through a city park unacceptable.
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cuit's opinion .20 Fortunately, the Supreme Court wrote a more
practical opinion, squarely based on prior case law and the exigen-
cies of agency practice.
1. The Court's Treatment of the Arbitrariness Standard
On the specific issue of what is an arbitrary and capricious
revocation decision-the portion of State Farm most relevant to
future agency deregulatory decisions-the Supreme Court identi-
fied four flaws in the typical deregulation decision that an agency
must avoid in the future:
(1) Reliance on factors which Congress did not intend to have the
agency consider;
(2) "Entire" failure to consider an important aspect of the problem;
(3) Explanation of the decision that runs contrary to the evidence
before the agency; or
(4) Explanations so implausible that they cannot be ascribed to differ-
ent views of the facts or to agency expertise. °4
According to State Farm, an agency seeking to deregulate must
pay close attention to detail. The agency must be record-conscious
and add the proper documentation to support the key conclusion
that rescission is needed or documentation to show that the modi-
fication will make the program work better.
2. The Effect of Uncertainties on "Arbitrariness" Review
An important ramification of the State Farm decision is the
Court's determination that, if an agency's decision to rescind a rule
is based less upon facts and more upon the agency's expert opinion
concerning the potential effectiveness of the rule, the agency's de-
cision to rescind may not survive an arbitrariness review. 20 5 One of
203. For example, the circuit court's reliance on its own perception of Congress' moods
based on committee reports and floor speeches would be a difficult standard for an agency
to conform to in any future rescission decisions. Historically, agencies have followed the
District of Columbia Circuit and have tried to conform to its signals, but the jumble of
legislative commands on which the District of Columbia Circuit relied in State Farm poses a
potential problem for agencies trying to follow any one guidepost of legislative commands.
204. State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2867. An expert commentator has paralleled that list
with his own requirements: factual support; findings based on those facts; an explanation of
the conclusion that was reached; an explanation that is logically coherent; due regard for
agency precedent; consideration of alternatives and adequacy of the underlying documents.
Allen, supra note 52, at v. Following a combination of the two lists would be a safe course
for an agency, although "none of us has any very good idea what [arbitrariness would]
mean." Id. at vi.
205. State Farm strongly suggests that the benefit of the doubt be given to continua-
tion of the existing rule. The Court created a presumption that the "settled course of behav-
ior" is correct. 103 S. Ct. at 2866.
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the uncertainties in State Farm was the technical debate over au-
tomobile seat belt usage. The agency had concluded that it could
not predict reliably even a minimal increase in expected usage.2 0e
Having found uncertainty, the agency concluded that the uncer-
tainty led to doubt whether the rule would meet the goal of addi-
tional safety and decided to rescind the rule. The Court refused to
accept this rationale for rescission and required more evidence of
the rule's ineffectiveness.207 The Court found abandonment of a
rule too drastic a remedy for "uncertainty"--an agency should
consider amendment or inclusion of alternatives before
rescission. o8
This aspect of State Farm is significant because uncertainties
abound in many substantive regulations. Some percentage of rules
simply will not work as planned, and some smaller percentage of
rule-established programs will not work at all. The State Farm
Court was probably correct, however, in fearing the use of uncer-
tainties to justify rescissions. If the Court were to set the judicial
review standard so low that existence of an uncertainty about a
rule's effectiveness triggered permission for the agency rapidly to
rescind the rule, the pretext of an uncertainty would be readily
available for any agency wishing to effect a political policy change
through the rescission of past administrations' regulations.2 0 9 A
problem may develop when an agency's rule really has failed. The
agency will want to justify rescission in words that do as little po-
litical damage as possible. The courts, however, after State Farm,
will require an explicit showing of the failure in order to sustain
the rescission. Agencies may come to feel implicit tension-too ex-
plicit a statement of failure is politically damning, while too subtle
206. Id. at 2871 (citing 46 Fed. Reg. 53,423 (1981)).
207. State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2871. After State Farm, agency use of the pretext of an
undesirable uncertainty about effectiveness to promote repeal of a rule is incorrect unless
the agency can show a firm justification based on the existing evidence. Id. at 2871-72.
208. Id. at 2868-69, 2873. The opinion suggests that it would be best for an agency to
search out additional evidence and to use it in modification or to conduct further research
before acting. The haste of the agency's decision to rescind was a factor in the Supreme
Court's response to the decision.
209. For example, a gap in scientific information about a technical rule occurs so fre-
quently that its appearance is routine. In environmental or human cancer matters, for in-
stance, more often than not an agency must make a policy decision about the technical rule
that includes assumptions or extrapolations rather than straightforward facts. "It is not in-
frequent that the available data does not settle a regulatory issue and the agency must then
exercise its judgment in moving from the facts and probabilities on the record to a policy
conclusion." Id. at 2871.
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a statement of failure may be reversible in the courts.21 0
Due process is not the sole measure of arbitrariness review. In
State Farm the agency asserted that the arbitrariness standard of
section 706 requires no more than minimum rationality, similar to
the constitutional due process analysis courts apply to legislative
enactments. 211 The Court rejected this comparison and held that
the presumption of regularity courts give to rules fulfilling a statu-
tory mandate is less than the presumption afforded to legislation
drafted by Congress.212 The Court, however, did not equate arbi-
trariness with a lack of direct supporting evidence.2" To have done
so might have elevated arbitrariness, the test for informal rulemak-
ing, to a requirement of substantial evidence, the test for formal
rules.21 4 When an agency drafts an informal rule, it can clarify fac-
tual uncertainties with reasonable policy choices based on experi-
ence. This policy is well-accepted judicially and often practiced ad-
ministratively. 2 5 When an agency is rescinding a rule, however, the
agency cannot claim that the same "substantial uncertainties" are
enough to justify the rescission.216 The agency must have an expla-
nation for the rescission that shows a rational connection between
the facts-for example, problems with implementation-and the
decision to rescind the regulation.217
210. The Court allowed for the possibility that "serious uncertainties" could justify
the rescission of a rule but only "if supported by the record and reasonably explained." Id.;
see generally Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alterna-
tives, and Reform, 92 HARv. L. REV. 549, 560-78 (1979) (discussion of some typical problems
characteristic of particular regulatory regimes).
211. State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2866 n.9.
212. Id.; see also McGowan, supra note 43, at 245.
213. State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2871.
214. Although the two tests are statutorily distinct, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E) (1982),
courts have tended to combine them. As the Ninth Circuit has stated, "[It would be] diffi-
cult to imagine a decision having no substantial evidence to support it which is not 'arbi-
trary', or a decision struck down as arbitrary which is in fact supported by 'substantial
evidence ... ."' Associated Indus. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 349 (2d Cir.
1973). Other circuits have made similar observations of congruity. See, e.g., AFL-CIO v.
Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 649 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated, 449 U.S. 809 (1980), modified,
452 U.S. 490 (1981); Short Haul Survival Comm. v. United States, 572 F.2d 240, 244 (9th
Cir. 1978); Superior Oil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 563 F.2d 191, 199 (5th
Cir. 1977); Bunny Bear, Inc. v. Peterson, 473 F.2d 1002, 1005-06 (1st Cir. 1973).
215. The Court in State Farm refers to this as an "exercise [of] its judgment in mov-
ing from the facts and probabilities on the record to a policy conclusion." 103 S. Ct. at 2871.
216. Id.




3. The Risk of Collateral Estoppel or Stare Decisis
The Supreme Court in State Farm adopted a presumption of
regularity for existing substantive regulations. As the Court stated,
"a settled course of behavior embodies the agency's informed judg-
ment that, by pursuing that course, it will carry out the policies
committed to it by Congress." ' This course of behavior triggers a
"presumption that those policies will be carried out best if the set-
tled rule is adhered to. ' 219 Though it stops short of stare decisis,
this theory of presumed validity of prior agency action is likely to
give agencies more difficulty when attempting to alter rules.
Agencies have preferred informal rulemaking for many years
because of its perceived ease of modification.2 20 The Food and
Drug Administration, for example, dislikes the set of formal
rulemaking procedures that accompany certain food regulations,
and thus substitutes, whenever possible, a nonstatutory form of
food quality regulation. One can view State Farm as cutting off
the last bastion of purely informal agency rulemaking. If the lower
courts, expanding upon State Farm, create too great a presump-
tion in favor of existing rules, they may prevent an agency from
effectively administering its domain.2
In one of the first major lower court rulemaking decisions after
State Farm, the District of Columbia Circuit added new weight to
the presumption in favor of existing regulation, and perhaps cre-
ated a form of rulemaking collateral estoppel. In Chaney v. Heck-
ler 223 the District of Columbia Circuit held that the preamble to a
218. State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2866 (quoting Atchison T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Wichita Bd.
of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807-08 (1973)).
219. State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2866.
220. Agencies will routinely avoid formal rulemaking whenever possible. This prefer-
ence was a significant aspect of early efforts toward regulatory reform legislation. See S.
1080, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Agencies endorsed the Administrative Conference recom-
mendation that Congress not require formal rulemaking in future statutes. See 1 C.F.R. §
305.72-5 (1983). Since formal rulemaking is much more difficult to use effectively, agencies
successfully have resisted its imposition in recent years. See, e.g., United States v. Florida E.
Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
221. 21 C.F.R. § 102.19 (1983) allows persons to file requests for informal rulemaking
in lieu of the formal food standards rulemaking process of hearings under 21 U.S.C. § 371(e)
(1982). The longest and most formal rulemaking hearings in FDA history ended with Corn
Prod. Co. v. FDA, 427 F.2d 511 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Derby Foods, Inc. v. FDA,
400 U.S. 957 (1970); they are chronicled in Hamilton, Rulemaking on a Record by the Food
and Drug Administration, 50 TEx. L. Rv. 1132 (1972).
222. The courts, themselves, have conceded the stultifying effect of requiring more
procedure. See, e.g., Pactra Indus., Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, 555 F.2d 677,
685 (9th Cir. 1977).
223. 718 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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1972 proposed rule, which contained a policy of nonenforcement of
part of the enabling statute, remained valid after the proposed rule
was withdrawn. The court determined that the agency would have
to give notice and seek comments before acting inconsistently with
the policy contained in that preamble.224 The holding in this case
further hampers an agency's ability informally to change its policy.
Now, even if an agency has overcome the presumed validity of an
existing rule and properly has rescinded it, the deregulation at-
tempt still may be thwarted by a forgotten preamble.
4. The Rescinding Agency's Burden with Alternatives
When a technological alternative, such as air bags, is available,
rescission might be arbitrary unless the agency considers the alter-
native. The agency in State Farm failed to consider fully the air
bag alternative. The Supreme Court found that, given the agency's
past judgment that air bags were effective and cost beneficial, the
mandatory passive restraint rule "may not be abandoned without
any consideration whatsoever of an airbags-only requirement.
2 25
The Court did not insist on any particular new rulemaking meth-
ods to be followed by the agency 226-it required only that one spe-
cific technological alternative be considered. The Court explicitly
refused to require an agency to consider all policy alternatives.227
Where the Court will draw the line for arbitrary nonconsidera-
tion of an alternative is not certain. Vermont Yankee teaches that
an agency need not explore fully all alternatives simply because
they are raised.228 State Farm teaches that an agency may not sim-
ply ignore a prominent technological alternative. 2 9 Therefore, an
agency's most prudent course is to place each of the commentors'
224. Id. at 1191. In the preamble, the FDA had stated that it would allow doctors to
prescribe drugs only for uses the FDA had approved. The challengers, death row inmates,
claimed that the use of certain drugs for executions violated this policy and that the FDA
should disapprove such use. Id. at 1176-79.
225. State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2871.
226. "We do not require today any specific procedures which NHTSA must follow."
Id. at 2870-71.
227. The Court refused broadly to "require an agency to consider all policy alterna-
tives in reaching decision," but where an alternative had been judged effective and cost
beneficial and was within the ambit of the existing standard, a court could compel an agency
to consider that alternative. Id. at 2871.
228. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
435 U.S. 519, 551 (1978), cited in State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2870-71.
229. State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2870-71. The option of air bags had gone so far in the
agency's technical assessment process that it became a foster child of the agency managers
and could not be abandoned lightly.
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alternatives into the final rule's preamble. 230 Then, the length of
discourse discarding the alternatives should be proportional to the
threat of reversal that the agency perceives to exist for not having
adopted that option.
5. Lessons for Agencies on Interpreting Legislative Intent
Another important lesson for agencies from State Farm is that
an agency should follow what Congress does, not necessarily what
it says. In State Farm the Supreme Court rejected the portion of
the District of Columbia Circuit's opinion that criticized the
agency for not heeding congressional debates over passive restraint
design and cost. The circuit court believed that these legislative
materials indicated Congress' approval of some type of required
passive restraint device.231 The Supreme Court set an important
principle in what might be called substatutory interpretation; the
District of Columbia Circuit's reliance on "legislative acts and non-
acts," such as the passive restraint debates, was wrong.23 2 The cir-
cuit court's extrapolation produced misguided analysis and ques-
tionable inferences. 233 An agency, therefore, can wait until Con-
gress has produced a statute before the agency rulemaking is
affected by official legislative action. The State Farm decision does
not suggest that agencies should ignore Congress. The Supreme
Court was simply "not. . .so quick to infer a congressional man-
date for passive restraints. '23 4 Although the Court may have be-
lieved that agency recognition of Congressional debate was desira-
ble, it refused, as in Vermont Yankee,233  to force the
230. The legendary preamble of all time may be the OSHA Cancer Policy Preamble
that consumed over 250 pages before addressing the rule itself. 45 Fed. Reg. 5002 (1980). An
executive order now requires the consideration of alternatives, but provides that such con-
sideration may be included in a "regulatory analysis document" and not in the preamble
published in the Federal Register. Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 3(d)(4), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193
(1981). Since Vermont Yankee, however, courts have not required agencies to reply substan-
tively to each comment they receive. See South Carolina ex rel. Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d
874, 885-86 (4th Cir. 1983); Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164, 1171
(D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980); Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v.
Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
231. See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Department of Transp., 680 F.2d 206,
222-28 (D.C. Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm
Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856, 2867 (1983).
232. 103 S. Ct. at 2867.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 2868.
235. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519 (1978). In Vermont Yankee the Court refused to require procedures beyond those
that the APA required. See also Byse, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administra-
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administrative agency to look beyond a statutory mandate. If the
statute provides for an agency action, it is a mandate; if not, it may
be desirable action but is not required.2 36
The teaching of State Farm on legislative intent is that an
agency has a qualified immunity from reversal when it modifies a
rule contrary to legislators' speeches and resolutions opposing
modification, so long as the agency meets the procedural require-
ments of modification2 7 and so long as Congress has not yet
turned its speeches into statutory action.23 8 Congressional com-
ments on existing laws, made after enactment, are not controlling
on the agency's choice of its course of action.2s9 Agency managers,
of course, never will be immune to vibrations from Capitol Hill,
nor should they be. Congressional pressure for or against a rule
provides a significant perspective for an agency when choosing
whether to keep or rescind a particular rule.
Congress still retains the ultimate control over agency deci-
sions made under delegations of legislative power. Immigration
Naturalization Service v. Chadha,24 ° which invalidated the legisla-
tive veto, made a small contribution to the independence of the
agencies by compelling Congress to undertake a formal statutory
change in order to "veto" an agency decision. Chadha and State
Farm are consistent because both decisions urge Congress to over-
rule agencies only by properly adopted legislation. The Supreme
Court, then, has made it easier for an agency to pursue a policy
opposed by Congress. Congress can no longer look to the courts in
tive Procedure: A Somewhat Different View, 91 HRv. L. REv. 1823 (1978); Scalia, supra
note 201; Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91
HARv. L. REv. 1805 (1978); Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking: Waiting for
Vermont Yankee II, 55 TuL. L. Rav. 418 (1981).
236. The relation between Vermont Yankee and State Farm in their direction to the
agency can be overstated. In State Farm the Supreme Court took care to restrain from
drawing parallels between the two cases because of overstatements about Vermont Yankee
in the briefs. State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2870-71.
237. The procedural requirements include notice and comment and the steps neces-
sary to establish an adequate administrative record. See infra text accompanying notes 245-
51.
238. Clearly, if Congress had modified the statute at issue in State Farm, the agency
would have been compelled to follow it. Even the District of Columbia Circuit recognized
that intervening action by Congress in the form of legislation would have concluded debate
about intentions and policies. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Department of Transp.,
680 F.2d 206, 242 (D.C. Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v.
State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856, 2868 (1983).
239. Nor are these comments controlling on the standard for judicial review. State
Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2867.
240. Id. at 2764.
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every instance to strike down any agency deregulation that legisla-
tors dislike. The courts now will require statutory change as a basis
for reversing an agency's procedurally correct modification or re-
scission action.241
D. The Problem for Any New Administration
At some future time, a post-Reagan administration may wish
to strengthen the agency rules of the 1981 to 1984 period. A modi-
fication increasing the tautness of regulation will be as onerous as
an easing of the "regulatory ratchet 242 because of the judicial re-
view developments from 1982 to 1984. An analysis of the burdens a
new administration will face will shed some light on the utility of
the alternatives to rescission.248
It is likely that a new administration will have a more permis-
sive approach to regulation than the Reagan Administration.
Before the new managers of the bureaucracy begin modifying a
rule to strengthen its coverage or degree of control, the agency first
must look at past rules. Since the Chaney decision,2" the agency
also must examine past preambles. The new managers must re-
scind those rules and preambles that conflict with the new ap-
proach by using notice and comment rulemaking. Even if the regu-
lated parties initially accept the new rules, a challenger can attack
the procedural compliance of the changes years later.245 That dan-
ger is a result of tighter judicial review as well as the vulnerability
of amended rules that have lost some of their original rationale.
To avoid a successful challenge, an agency strengthening a
rule first must conduct a close examination of the past rule and
preamble text. Next, the agency must support the modification in
the factual record. The agency should complete one or more stud-
ies of the stronger rule. The agency must weigh possible increased
compliance costs with the probability of achieving the goals of the
241. One could argue that the Supreme Court was as wrong in its view of legislative
signals as the District of Columbia Circuit had been. The Supreme Court may have been too
stringent in requiring express legislation changes, since in pragmatic terms, Congress sends
many signals, and agencies obey them without alteration of statutes. The inhibition of this
process, therefore, may be a futile attempt to change reality.
242. But see E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GOING By THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULA-
TORY UNREASONABLENESS 197 (1982) ("Slowing the upward rate of the regulatory ratchet
wheel ... is not the same as turning it back.").
243. See supra part V.
244. 718 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
245. See Allen, Thoughts on the Jeopardy of Rules of Long Standing to Procedural
Challenge, 33 AD. L. REV. 203, 207 (1981).
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new rule. 48 The agency also must prepare a factual record with the
understanding that opponents will test it in the courts. The agency
should assume no facts. If the rule concerns the frontiers of sci-
ence, the agency should cast any assumptions as policy choices247
or as facts determined only through the agency's years of exper-
tise,248 to shield such choices from intrusive judicial review. Fi-
nally, the agency head must write the preamble to the final rule to
connect the facts found with the new, stronger rule. The agency
manager must explain adequately the connection and include such
relevant factors as the criteria of the statute that guided the
agency's modification. Of course, the agency must exclude imper-
missible considerations2 4 9 The preamble to the proposed stronger
rule should emphasize the agency's policy reconsideration of the
need for more protection. If Congress had considered changing the
statute in the area covered by the rule but failed to do so, then
State Farm suggests that the agency must address that issue by
noting that Congress has not modified the statute.250
An agency head reading this detailed exposition of additional
duties should not despair. An agency still can change its rules. In-
deed, one can speculate that the more liberal members of the judi-
ciary will temper their review if the agency's proposed changes cre-
ate stronger public protective measures. An agency head in a
future administration who denounces the cumbersome rule-chang-
ing process described here need only reflect on the fact that APA
reforms-reforms that would have altered this judicially added set
of modification requirements-were defeated by opponents of the
Reagan Administration 251 and were stymied even during the Carter
246. In State Farm the Supreme Court observed that the agency had been correct in
its effort to look at costs of the rule, but the Court differed with assumptions underlying the
outcome of that cost-benefit discussion. 103 S. Ct. 2856, 2873 (1983); see also American
Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981); Industrial Union Dep't v. Ameri-
can Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
247. State Farm, however, may limit some of the expansive uses of the argument that
a factually weak choice is a policy decision. See 103 S. Ct. at 2871.
248. Expertise in determining facts still merits some judicial deference. McGowan,
supra note 43, at 245.
249. For example, if a farm safety law forbade the consideration of costs to farmers of
safety services, the agency should exclude cost analyses as a determining factor and mention
the statutory exclusion of the preamble. "[A]n agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious
if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider ..
State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2867.
250. After State Farm, no discourse short of statutory change will result in a net force
against an existing rule. Postenactment legislative opinions carry little weight. Id. at 2867.
251. See J. O'RILLY, supra note 115, § 1.05 (brief account of the reform battle).
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Administration.25" Reform is not a short-term objective.
E. Summary
After State Farm the courts have more latitude in assessing
deregulation under the dominant "arbitrary and capricious" stan-
dard.25 3 For example, the courts have directed much of their criti-
cism of deregulation at the explanations given by the agencies. The
courts have remanded some deregulatory changes because of weak
factual rationales expressed in a rule's preamble. State Farm is
consistent with this effort because of its remand for articulation of
the agency's evidence.25' This trend is a revival of the 1970's "hard
look" movement. 55 In the 1970's cases the courts reversed the
agencies because the factual presentation of the rule was too ob-
scure to allow judicial review.256 The new trend, however, has gone
further in supporting reversal. An agency manager now must do
more than merely state the basis of the rule; expectations of judi-
cial deference no longer shield the agency's policy conclusions from
review. A prudent agency manager will check the supporting docu-
ments and regulatory and environmental analyses, index the re-
cord, and use any other means necessary to assure that the rule
will pass the stricter examination of its substance that the courts
now will apply. The growth of the Federal Register will not be a
result of increased length of the rules, but a result of larger
volumes of preamble statements.2 " The Supreme Court appears to
have confirmed the strict review of deregulation against a "hard
252. Earlier reform acts failed to draw enough democratic support in the Congress to
assure passage. S. 262, S. 755, & H.R. 3263, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
253. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982); see supra text accompanying note 204.
254. 103 S. Ct. at 2869 (quoting Burlington Truck lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156,
167 (1962)).
255. See J. O'REiLLY, supra note 115, §§ 15.04, .06.
256. See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 140 (1973); National Lime Ass'n v. EPA,
627 F.2d 416, 430 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Harborlite Corp. v. ICC, 613 F.2d 1088, 1092-93 (D.C.
Cir. 1979); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
257. The new, higher quality standard for informal rulemaking preambles will be a
matter of great attention for agencies following the State Farm decision. Though the Su-
preme Court disagreed with the lower court view of the threshold for reversal, it did reverse
the agency because of inadequacies in the treatment of air bags factual issues in the
agency's preamble documents. 103 S. Ct. at 2868-70. The preamble is the principal vehicle
within which an agency articulates its basis, and if that preamble is silent, a court will not
supply the missing links of support for the text of the rule. Id. at 2867 (quoting SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)). Preamble lengths have increased in the last sev-





The judicial review of deregulatory actions has moved quite
far from the placid, deferential review that courts once gave agen-
cies during the halycon days of rulemaking. Regulated groups have
noted carefully the courts' hostility to change. When a future ad-
ministration attempts to adopt stronger rules, these groups will use
the established deregulation precedents to restrain the ability of
the agencies to modify the scale of regulation.
The time and difficulty of changing "informal" rulemaking is
now greater than at any time since formal and informal rulemaking
procedures were created in 1946. Efforts to amend the 1946 APA
failed for other political reasons, but had they been adopted, some
of the cases from 1982 to 1984 might have had different outcomes.
Therefore, future agency managers may resurrect the regulatory
reform movement as a means of overcoming the new form of stare
decisis that the courts have created.
Commentators have predicted this "stare decisis" effect of
rules as a consequence of the judicial resistance to deregulation in
the 1982 to 1984 period.2 59 These predictions have proved correct
in the short term. The State Farm decision encourages courts to
preserve existing regulations against forces of change. The pre-
sumption of validity for existing rules means that the rescission or
modification of a regulation will cost the agency dearly. Courts, es-
pecially the District of Columbia Circuit, will be defending the ex-
isting rules with more vigilance than ever before.
Courts may be resurrecting the "entitlements" concept 260 of
due process and applying it to rulemaking in the latter half of the
1980's. The beneficiaries of safety or economic regulation may as-
sert "rulemaking entitlements" to deter the reform of agency rules.
Conceptually, it is difficult to correlate life sustaining adjudications
of benefit entitlements with industry preserving, or air quality pro-
tecting, maintenance of existing rules. While the Supreme Court in
State Farm did not go so far as to create a new entitlements con-
258. 103 S. Ct. at 2869-70.
259. "[T]he problems of repealing rules cannot be separated from the broader ques-
tion whether rules... create new categories of vested interests that have a presumptive
right to the continuation of regulation." DeLong, Repealing Rules, REG., May-June 1983, at
26, 30.
260. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (due process entitles a welfare
recipient to a pretermination hearing on continued eligibility to receive benefits).
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cept, the Court's direction may permit lower courts to do so.
For challenges of the status quo, be they administrative man-
agers or outsiders, the entitlements approach would be a difficult
barrier to pass. The courts will not enshrine the Code of Federal
Regulations like the Constitution, of course, but future administra-
tions will find it much more difficult to alter rules to meet their
political and policy desires. The appellate judges who "teach" the
agencies have been grading the current administration poorly, but
future agency managers will find that the school rules have become
more difficult for all students alike.

